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LOOKING FOR MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA WHEN 
GEOGRAPHY MATTERS: GERMAN CITY GROWTH 





Many modern trade and growth models are characterized by multiple equilibria. In theory the 
analysis of multiple equilibria is possible, but in practice it is difficult to test for the presence 
of multiple equilibria. Based on the methodology developed by Davis and Weinstein (2004) 
for the case of Japanese cities and WWII, we look for multiple equilibria in a model of 
German city growth. The strategic bombing of Germany during WWII enables us to assess 
the empirical relevance of multiple equilibria in a model of city-growth. In doing so, and in 
addition to the Davis and Weinstein framework, we look at the spatial inter-dependencies 
between cities. The main findings are twofold. First, multiple equilibria seem to be present in 
German city growth. Our evidence supports a model with 2 stable equilibria. Second, the 
explicit inclusion of geography matters. Evidence for multiple equilibria is weaker when 
spatial interdependencies are not taken into account. 
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1.     Introduction 
One of the central characteristics of New Economic Geography (NEG) models is the 
presence of multiple equilibria. Ever since the pioneering work of Krugman (1991) this 
has been one of the fundamental insights of this literature. Especially the theoretical 
analysis of multiple equilibria has made impressive progress. The early models of the 
NEG literature relied on numerical analyses, but since the work of Puga (1999) and 
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), who introduced the break and sustain analysis of 
equilibria, analytical results became possible. Given the prevalence of multiple 
equilibria in not just the NEG models but in many modern trade and growth models, it 
is remarkable that empirical research into the existence of multiple equilibria is almost 
completely absent. Davis and Weinstein (2004) are among the first to test for the 
presence of multiple equilibria in a NEG setting. Their study is a sequel to Davis and 
Weinstein (2002). In the latter they analyse for the case of Japan whether or not a large 
and temporary shock like the WWII bombing affected the relative growth of cities in the 
post war period. They find that this is not the case. This conclusion also holds, to some 
degree, for the case of (western) German cities and the WWII shock, as is shown by 
Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004). Head and Mayer (2004, p.2662) observe, on 
the basis of these two studies that “…it is tempting to conclude that the greater the 
constraint imposed by physical Geography, the greater will be the tendency for shocks 
to undo themselves over time.” This also suggests that the real world is not 
characterized by multiple equilibria, and that the possibility of multiple equilibria 
should at best be characterized as “theoretical exotica”.  
 
Based on the findings of these two papers such a pessimistic conclusion about the 
empirical (ir)relevance of multiple equilibria is, however, perhaps drawn too soon (see 
also Gabaix and Ioannides. 2004). First, it is important to note that the standard 
Krugman (1991) NEG model only predicts a “switch” to a new equilibrium for certain 
ranges of the key parameters. So the evidence of persistence in the evolution of city 
sizes after an exogenous shock can still be consistent with a NEG model. The absence 
of finding empirical evidence of multiple equilibria does not necessarily reject these 
models as such. Second, and most important for this paper, before dismissing the 
possibility of multiple equilibria we should test this possibility explicitly. The latter is 
exactly what Davis and Weinstein (2004) set out to do for Japan. They develop an 
  2innovative method that examines necessary conditions for multiple equilibria for the 
case of Japanese city growth and the WWII shock. A rejection of these necessary 
conditions would be a more powerful rejection of the presence of multiple equilibria 
than the implicit rejection in Davis and Weinstein (2002).
2  
 
Their methodology can, however, be criticised for the fact that it does not include 
geography or location. Davis and Weinstein (2004) assume that the evolution of city 
shares is independent of the evolution of other city shares. This assumption is at odds 
with another fundamental characteristic of NEG models. That is, the evolution of the 
city-size of an individual city depends on the attractiveness of this city relative to the 
attractiveness of other cities. In this paper we not only apply the methodology 
developed by Davis and Weinstein (2004) to the strategic bombing of German cities 
during WWII, but also include geography explicitly in our test. In doing so, our 
approach is more in line with the standard NEG models. It turns out that the inclusion of 
geography is important, and contributes fundamentally to our positive evidence for 
multiple equilibria for our sample of German cities. 
 
In section 2 we will present theoretical background information on multiple equilibria, 
and illustrate this graphically. Section 3 describes the extent of the destruction of 
German cities during WWII. It motivates that this constitutes a large exogenous shock 
to the German city size distribution that is large enough to reveal multiple equilibria if 
these are present. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology. The data and our 
findings are described in section 5. It is shown that geography is very important for our 
results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical  Background 
A central feature of many modern trade and growth models is that they have multiple 
equilibria. This is also true for the new economic geography literature, the attempt by 
mainstream economics to (re-) introduce the role of geography into economics. 
Following the seminal work by Krugman (1991), new economic geography models 
                                                 
2 Note that their approach differs from that of Redding et al. (2005), who use an extended gravity model 
approach. Redding et al. (2005) analyze the location of main airport hubs. They find evidence that after 
the split of Germany into East and West Germany Berlin was not able to hold its position as main airport 
hub; Frankfurt became the main airport. After the reunification this relative position did not change. 
According to the authors this is evidence that the equilibrium changed. 
  3endogenize the location decisions of mobile firms and workers and typically display 
multiple equilibria. Figure 1 illustrates this for the Krugman (1991) model with 2 






Figure 1 Multiple equilibria in the Krugman (1991) model. 
 
he curve in Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium allocation of the footloose production 
2-region equilibria














between the 2 regions. Each point on the curve represents a short-run equilibrium where 
for a given allocation of the footloose production, factor and goods markets in the 2 
regions clear. In the long run, the share of footloose production is no longer given but 
becomes an endogenous variable (this is really the hallmark of the Krugman model). In 
the long run we have an equilibrium when the footloose factors do no longer have an 
incentive to re-locate (in Figure 1 there are 5 such long run equilibria, A-E). Along the 
horizontal axis the share of the footloose production in region 1 is depicted, which 
ranges from zero (no footloose activity in region 1) to one (all footloose activity 
concentrated in region 1). The footloose sector is the manufacturing sector, and its share 
of manufacturing labour force depicts a region’s share of footloose production. The 
other sector is assumed to be tied to a region (agriculture), that is to say its workers are 
immobile, and this has the function that there is always a residual demand in the 
peripheral region, even if the footloose labour force is completely concentrated in the 
  4other region. This prevents the model from collapsing into a single region model. The 
vertical axis in Figure 1 gives the ratio of real wages between region 1 and 2, w1/w2 . In 
the basic Krugman (1991) model workers migrate if real wages in the other region are 
higher. Real wage equality indicates a long run equilibrium; no worker has an incentive 
to migrate. Figure 1 gives three of these equilibria, B, C, and D where B and D are 
unstable equilibria. If a mobile worker moves away from equilibria like B or D, either to 
region 1 or 2, other workers will follow. C is a stable equilibrium, if a worker would 
relocate real wages will change in such a way that she has an incentive to return. 
Complete agglomerations, equilibria A and E are also stable equilibria (although the 
concept of the ratio of real wages is hypothetical here-there are no footloose workers in 
the other region to compare wages).  
 
The arrows along the curve point towards the stable equilibria in this model and show in 
For our present purposes the point to emphasize is that Figure 1 shows that multiple 
                                                
which direction migration takes place. If the economy finds itself in a point like F, 
where  w1>w2 migration of footloose workers from region 2 to region 1 will ensure that 
we end up in the stable symmetric equilibrium C. The analysis of agglomerating and 
spreading forces that leads to figures like Figure 1 is well-known and we do not dwell 
on this any further here.
  3 As is also emphasized by Davis and Weinstein (2004), 
extensions of the Krugman (1991) model also allow for asymmetric stable equilibria 
where one ends up with partial agglomeration. For our present purposes and in terms of 
Figure 1, we want to emphasize that for an interior equilibrium like C (that is an 
equilibrium without complete agglomeration), to be stable we need a negative slope and 
the unstable equilibria (here, B and D) can be looked upon as thresholds when we pass 
from one stable equilibrium to another stable equilibrium.      
equilibria are a central characteristic of the Krugman (1991) model. Given the 
assumption that the economy is initially in a stable equilibrium, a relocation or shock to 
the footloose labour force can in theory have two implications for the long run 
equilibrium. The shock is small and workers return to their original location that is to 
say to the initial stable equilibrium, or the relocation is large enough to pass the 
 
3 For a more extensive discussion of the Krugman (1991) model see Fujita, Krugman, Venables (1999), 
Brakman, Garretsen, van Marrewijk (2001), Fujita and Thisse (2002) or Baldwin et al (2003). Introducing 
additional (spreading) forces into this model increases the number of long-run equilibria (Brakman, 
Garretsen, Van Marrewijk, and Van den Berg (1999) and in particular opens the way to asymmetric, 
stable equilibria that is stable equilibria with partial agglomeration. 
  5threshold of the nearest unstable equilibrium and the economy moves to another stable 
equilibrium. Following Davis and Weinstein (2004) we can represent this adjustment 
process in a two period growth space as depicted in Figure 2.  In order to facilitate 
comparison we stick to their use of symbols from hereon. To make the transition from 
the Krugman (1991) model to cities and city-growth, we replace a region’s share in the 
footloose labour force as our main variable of interest by the (log-) share of a city i in 
the total population, denoted by Si (where we can suppress the subscript i since all cities 
are assumed to be alike in terms of their reaction to a particular city-specific shock of  a 
given size, this is clearly an important (and restrictive) assumption as it means that the 
model underlying Figure 2 is based on the notion of a representative city).
4     
 
Figure 2. Two-period growth representation of a model with 3 stable equilibria 
 
et Ώ indicate the initial stable equilibrium and let Δ1 and Δ3 depict two surrounding 
able equilibria. If a shock that hits a city is too small to pass the thresholds b1 or b2 the 









city share will return to the initial equilibrium, implying that the second period change 
will completely and precisely undo the shock. This is indicated by the line through the 
 
4 Note that using log-shares, reformulates the model in growth rates. This facilitates the empirical 
analysis. Furthermore, Figure 2 thus indicates that each region or city has the same response to the same 
shock. A shock of size X that changes the equilibrium for city A does the same for region or city B. 
Another important innovation of Davis and Weinstein  (2004), as compared to Davis and Weinstein 
(2002), is that they do not only model city growth in terms of city population but also in terms of 
economic activity, the change of manufacturing activity across Japanese cities. We return to this in 
section 5.4.  
  6origin with a slope of minus unity. The period t is the period that includes the shock and 
the period t+1 is the period in which the effects of the shock are precisely undone, 
hence the slope of  -1 (Davis and Weinstein, 2004, p. 7). For an equilibrium to be stable 
it must the case in this 2 period growth set-up that there exists a period t+1 that is long 
enough such that ΔSt=-ΔSt+1. To see this, return to Figure 1, and assume that starting 
from the initial, stable equilibrium C a shock occurs in period t that moves the economy 
to point F. It may take a while, that is period t+1 can be quite long, but ultimately the 
economy will have to return to point C which means that the effect of a shock at period t 
is exactly off-set in period t+1. It is an empirical matter if the time series for t+1 are 
long enough to include a point like C. So in practice the slope could be less than 1 (in 
absolute terms). We will return to this issue in section 5. 
 
If the shock is large enough to move the city’s population share outside the range b1-b2, 
 new stable equilibrium will be established and the economy will move to Δ1 or Δ3 
d Weinstein (2004) set-up is that we do take spatial 
terdependencies into account. What happens to a particular city following the shock 
a
depending on whether the city is hit by a negative or positive shock. But each new 
stable equilibrium it must also be true in our 2 period setting that ΔSt=-ΔSt+1. For the 
example of 3 stable equilibria of Figure 2 these two possibilities are indicated by the 
two solid lines through Δ1 and Δ3 also with a slope of minus unity.
5 To sum up, in case 
of multiple equilibria we end up in the two period growth setting of Figure 2 with a 
sequence of negative sloped lines with slope minus unity, where each line corresponds 
to a different stable equilibrium.  
 
Our difference with the Davis an
in
could in princple also be determined by the shock that hit other cities. In other words, in 
our empirical strategy to test the model underlying Figure 2 we assume that 
) , ( , , , 1 i j t i t i t S S f S ≠ + Δ Δ = Δ , where besides the time subscript, t, we also include a region or 
city subscript, i, j. The reason can most easily be understood by looking once more at 
sential insights from new economic geography literature is that  Figure 1. One of the es
                                                 
5 For an equilibrium to be stable there always must exist a period t+1 that is long enough so as to ensure 
that the slope will be minus unity. So from a theoretical perspective our translation of a new economic 
geography model like Figure 1 (the Krugman (1991) model) in the 2 period growth space of Figure 2 
gives a foundation for a slope of minus one in (St, St+1) space. This will turn out to be important for the 
empirical testing of the model underlying Figure 2. From this theoretical perspective any other slope than 
–1 in Figure 2 is hard to justify if the sample period for St+1 is long enough.  
  7regions or cities should not be analysed in isolation, but relative to other regions. It is 
the relative position of one region to another that determines the relocation of the 
footloose workers in Figure 1. For the empirical analysis this implies that one should 
not only look at the change in the size of a region or city, but also at the change of that 
region or city relative to the change in size of surrounding regions or cities corrected for 
inter-city distance. In section 4 we will deal with these issues and our “geography” 
extension in more detail. But first we will briefly illustrate that the strategic bombing of 
German cities during WW II provides indeed a large, temporary shock that makes it 
good candidate to look for the presence of multiple equilibria in German city-growth.  
 
3  The Strategic Bombing of Germany 
6
During the Second World War (WWII), allied forces heavily bombed Germany. 





f the dwellings in the larger cities was destroyed (which is roughly 
omparable with the findings of Davis and Weinstein (2002) for Japan). An estimated 
                                                
Initially these bombardments had little effect on
limited success of the air raids led to a change in bombing tactics. From March 19
onwards, RAF bomber command launched a new bombing method. The emphasis in 
this new program was on area bombing, in which the centers of towns would be the 
main target. The central idea of this strategy was that the destruction of cities would 
have an enormous and destructive effect on the morale of the people living in it. The
dislocation of workers would in any case disrupt industrial production even if the 
factories themselves were not hit. Targeted cities were not necessarily selected becaus
they were particularly important for the war economy, but because they were visib
from the air. The economic importance of cities was often not decisive in the selection 
of targets after the RAF initiated the changed bombing strategy, but the potential for 
destruction was.  
 
On average 40% o
c
410.000 people lost their lives due to air raids, and at least seven million people lost 
their homes. As a result in 1946 the population of quite a few German cities was (in 
absolute terms) considerably lower than the corresponding population in 1939.  
 
 
6 To a large extent the information in this section is based on Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004) to 
which we refer for more details. 





ased on the above information our conclusion is that the strategic bombing of 
 by 
.  Model Specification  
WII shock on German city growth, we employ the 
or the case of a unique equilibrium, following also Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm 
WWII. The destruction was primarily caused by the bombing campaign but in cont
to Japan, also by the invasion of Germany by the allied forces. These ground battles 
implied additional and severe damage to cities that were in the path of the allied force
In addition, by the end of the war the encounter between the Russian forces and the 
retreating German army led to an enormous inflow of refugees (Vertriebene) from 
former German territories and East European countries. Rough estimates indicate th
between 11 and 14 million refugees had to find a new home in Germany (both in easter
and western Germany). This inflow of German refugees more than compensated for the 
loss of lives in Germany itself. The combined effect of the bombing campaign and the 
flow of refugees effected the city size distribution in Germany enormously (Brakman, 
Garretsen, and Schramm, 2004).  
 
B
Germany during the WW II and the consequences of the occupation of Germany
allied forces is an example of a large shock that could enable us to find evidence for 




As a formal test of the W
methodology employed by Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2004). In Davis and Weinstein 
(2002) the main hypothesis is whether the evidence supports the idea of unique, stable 
equilibrium following the WWII shock. In terms of Figure 2 they test whether it is true 
that the observations lie on a line with slope minus unity through the origin, that is the 
equilibrium depicted by Ώ in Figure 2. The possibility of other equilibria (in casu, Δ1 
and Δ3) is not taken into account in the analysis, which means that for the case of a 
unique equilibrium Figure 2 reduces to one line through the origin with slope minus 
unity. In Davis and Weinstein (2004) the model specification allows for the possibility 
of multiple equilibria just as Figure 2 illustrates.  
 
F
(2004), the line of reasoning is as follows.  The approach is basically to test whether or 
not   the growth of city size (with city size thus as a share of total population) follows a 
  9random walk. The relative city size s for each city i at time t can be represented by (in 
logs):  
(1)  it i it s ε + Ω =  
whe al eq re Ωi is the initi uilibrium size of city i and εit represents city-specific shocks.  
The persistence of a shock can be modeled as: 
(2)  1 , , 1 , + + + = t i t i t i ν ρε ε  
where νit is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and for the parameter ρ it is 
y first differencing (1) and by making use of (2) we get  
assumed that 0 ≤ ρ  ≤ 1.  
 
B
(3)  ( ) 1 , 1 , , , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + + − + + − = − t i t i t i t i t i s s ε ρ ρ ν ν ρ  
If ρ = 1, all shocks are permanent and city growth follows a random walk; if ρ ∈ [0,1), 
avis and Weinstein (2002, p.1280) note the value for the central parameter ρ could 
ibrium now becomes: 
the shock will dissipate over time. From Figure 2 we know that for the initial 
equilibrium to be stable that there must a period t+1 that is long enough so as to ensure 
that ρ = 0. With ρ = 0 the shock has no persistence at all. In Figure 2 this is the case 
when the observations lie on the line through the origin with slope minus unity. For 0 < 
ρ < 1 there is some degree of persistence (but ultimately the impact of the shock will 
dissipate over time). Of course, in its multiple equilibria version with which we deal 
below, Figure 2 also allows for another interpretation when it would be established after 
estimating equation (3) that 0 < ρ < 1: that there could be multiple equilibria and that 
we really should test for this possibility instead of for the case of an unique equilibrium. 
For the simpler case of a unique equilibrium we, however, only have to test whether or 
not in terms of Figure 2 the observations lie on a linee through the origin with slope 
minus unity. 
     
As D
be determined by employing a unit root test. The power of such a test is, however, not 
undisputed and the reason to use such a test is that usually the innovation vit cannot be 
identified. In our case, as in the Japanese case of Davis and Weinstein, the innovation 
can be identified as long as we have valid instruments for the war shock (si,1946 – si, 1939) 
that serves as vit  in the estimations for our German case below.  
The basic equation to be estimated for the case of a unique equil
  10(4)  i i i i i t i error Z s s s s + + + − = − + 0 1939 , 1946 , 1946 , 1946 , ) ( β α   
7
where α=ρ-1, β0 is a constant and Zi refers to control variables one might want to 
include.
8 If α=0 city growth follows a random walk. If we find that –1 ≤ α < 0 this is 
evidence that a random walk must be rejected and hence that the war shock had no 
effect at all (α=-1), or at most a temporary effect (-1 < α < 0) on relative city-growth in 
Germany. So, –1 ≤ α < 0 is evidence for a tendency towards a mean reverting growth 
process. In our 2 period growth setting, –1 ≤ α < 0 implies that the shock has had a 
permanent effect, the impact of the shock has not fully dissipated over time. To estimate 
equation (4) we have to choose a t for the left-hand side variable si,1946+t - si,1946. We 
choose  t  = 17 (indicating 1963) for our sample of West German cities which 
corresponds with the time horizon used by Davis and Weinstein (2002). Our implicit 
assumption here is that the period 1946-1963 should be long enough for the war shock 
to be fully absorbed. Also, the early 1960s mark the end of the reconstruction policies of 
the (west) German government. It must be emphasized that for the test of a unique 
equilibrium we do not want to restrict ρ to be zero (and hence α=-1), the data should tell 
us what the implied value of ρ is. Only when ρ is not significantly different from zero 
can it be concluded that the data support the case of the unique stable initial equilibrium 
Ω from Figure 2.  When the estimation results show that α differs significantly from -1 
(that is, ρ is not 0), this leads one to conclude that there might be multiple equilibria.  
 
Following Figure 2, the question is now how to change the empirical specification to 
allow for the possibility to actually test for multiple equilibria. To simplify matters, let’s 
assume for the moment that we know the number of equilibria and the thresholds, like 
b1 and b2 in Figure 2, that separates the various equilibria. After we have introduced the 
model using these two assumptions, we will need to relax these assumptions in our 
empirical specification of the model with multiple equilibria. The problem is how to 
adapt equation (3) to take into account multiple equilibria.  To answer this question, 
assume like in Figure 2 that there are three equilibria. The initial equilibrium is denoted 
(in log share) by Ωi , the second or low equilibrium is (- Δ1 log)-share units below the 
initial equilibrium (thus this equilibrium is located at Ωi+Δ1 in log space, recall Figure 2 
                                                 
7 Note that we can include a constant because the summation over all s is not equal to 1 (the share of a 
city is relative to the total population, and not to the sum of city sizes in our sample). 
8 Note that the measure of the shock (or innovation) is the growth rate between 1939 and 1946, which is 
correlated with the error term in the estimating equation. This indicates that we have to use instruments. 
  11from the previous section), and a third or high equilibrium at Ωi+Δ3. The lower and 
higher thresholds, are denoted by respectively b1 and b2 (in log shares) and let b2>b1.  
We then get for si,t+1
 
(5a)  si,t+1= Ωi+Δ1+ε
1
i,t+1  in case νi,t<b1 
(5b)  si,t+1= Ωi+ε
2 
i,t+1  in case b1< νi,t<b2
(5c)  si,t+1= Ωi+Δ3+ε
3
i,t+1  in case νi,t>b2  
 
Using equations (5) and subtracting (1) from (5), and also using the fact that the error 
terms change whenever the lower or upper threshold b1 or b2 is crossed, it can be shown 
(Davis and Weinstein (2004, pp. 21-23) that equation (3) becomes 
 
(6a)  [ ] 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + + − + + − + − Δ = − t i t i t i t i t i s s ε ρ ρ ν ν ρ ρ    in case νi,t<b1 
(6b)   [ ] 1 , 1 , , , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + + − + + − = − t i t i t i t i t i s s ε ρ ρ ν ν ρ      in case b1< νi,t<b2  
(6c)   [ ] 1 , 1 , , 3 , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + + − + + − + − Δ = − t i t i t i t i t i s s ε ρ ρ ν ν ρ ρ  in case νi,t>b2
 
Equation (6) replaces equation (3) in our example with three equilibria. Note that 
equation (6b) is exactly the same as equation (3)! Note also that equations (6a)-(6c) are 
the same but for their constant term. As a final step and taking into account that for our 
case of German cities t=1946, t+1=1963 and also that the war shock νi,t=νi,1946 will be 
approximated (see equation 4) by the wartime city growth  (si,1946-si,1939)  we follow 
Davis and Weinstein and rewrite equation (6): 
 
(7)      + − − + Δ − + Δ − = − ) )( 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 1939 , 1946 , 1946 , 2 3 3 1946 , 1 1 1 1946 , 1963 , i i i i i i s s b I b I s s ρ ν ρ ν ρ
   [ ] 1933 , 1963 , ) 1 ( i i ε ρ ρ ν − +       
 
where I1(b1,ν1946) and I2(b2,ν1946) are indicator variables that equal one if νi,t<b1 or νi,t>b2 
respectively.  
 
Equation (7) is the multiple equilibrium version of equation (4). Assuming that we have 
valid instruments for the wartime city growth, we are now in a position to estimate 
equation (4) and hence to test the unique equilibrium hypothesis, but this is not the case 
  12for equation (7) and the multiple equilibria hypothesis. The main problem with the latter 
is that we have assumed that the number of equilibria is known (three in our example) 
and also that we know the value of the thresholds, in casu b1 and b2.  But this has to be 
determined by the data, and not assumed beforehand.  
 
Estimating a log likelihood function that is maximized for the values of the thresholds 
and yields coefficients for Δ1, Δ3 seems the appropriate methodology to estimate (7).  
Davis and Weinstein (2004, p. 23) argue that this is problematic given that one also 
needs to instrument the wartime growth, and the instrumenting equation would then 
include the indicator variables, but these variables are in turn a function of the 
instrumented shocks.  To get around this econometrical problem, they impose that ρ = 0 
which means, in our case of German city growth and the WWII shock, that one assumes 
that whatever happens during the period of the shock (1939-1946) is precisely undone 
in the second period (here, 1946-1963). Or, in other words, with ρ = 0 we assume that 
the war-shock has no persistence. In our view and leaving aside the econometrical 
problem emphasized by Davis and Weinstein, the need for the ρ = 0 assumption already 
follows directly from the underlying theoretical model as summarized by Figure 2.  
Given that the period t+1 in Figure 2 is long enough for the shock from period t to have 
dissipated, a line represents a stable equilibrium with slope minus unity because that is 
ultimately what a stable equilibrium implies! This also means that as opposed to the 
case of the unique equilibrium, when testing for multiple equilibria theory tells us to 
impose that ρ = 0. If following a shock the one thing we know for sure is that the cities 
end up in some stable equilibrium (old or new) and that for any stable equilibrium it 
must be true that ultimately ΔSt= -ΔSt+1, which means that any other assumption than ρ 
= 0 is difficult to ground on the underlying model of city-growth.  Or to quote Davis 
and Weinstein (2004, p. 8) at some length about the implications of the model as 
summarized by Figure 2:  
“the 2 period growth space thus provides a very simple contrast between a model of 
unique equilibrium versus one of multiple equilibria. In the case of a unique 
equilibrium, an observation should simply lie on a line with slope minus unity through 
the origin. In the case of multiple equilibria, we get a sequence of lines, all with slopes 
minus unity, but with different intercepts. Because in this latter case these lines have 
slope minus unity, the intercepts are ordered and correspond to the displacement in log-
share space from the initial to the new equilibrium. These elements will be central when 
we turn to empirical analysis”             
 
  13In our view the (very important) assumption that ρ = 0 is thus already a consequence of 
the (implicit) theoretical model as summarized by Figure 2, once one assumes that the 
slopes of these curves are -1. Given the assumption that in the 2-period set-up, shocks 
from period t will have dissipated completely in t+1, thus with ρ = 0 equation (7) 
becomes:  
 
(8)   ( ) [ ] 1933 , 1963 , 1946 , 2 3 3 1946 , 1 1 1 1939 , 1963 , ) 1 ( ) , ( , i i i i i i b I b I s s ε ρ ρ ν ν ν − + + Δ + Δ = −   
  
Compared to equation (7), the relative city growth during the WWII period, si,1946-si,1939, 
has dropped out and one can now start to estimate equation (8) by selecting values for 
the parameters that maximize the likelihood function. 
 
5.   Data Set and Estimation Results 
5.1 Data set 
The data set that we used for the present paper is basically the same one as in Brakman, 
Garretsen and Schramm (2004); we therefore refer to the latter for more details on the 
bombing and destruction of German cities during WWII. The sample consists of cities 
in the territory of present-day Germany that either had a population of more than 50.000 
people in 1939 or that were in any point of time in the post-WWII period a so called 
Großstadt, a city with more than 100.000 inhabitants. This yields a sample of 103 cities 
in total, consisting of 81 West German and 22 East German cities. Based on our 
previous work we decided to restrict the analysis to the sub-sample of West-German 
cities. There are a number of reasons for doing this. First, the sub-sample for East-
German cities is rather small and data on war destruction are not as readily available for 
the GDR period. Secondly, and more importantly, in the post-WWII period East-
German cities were part of the communist GDR with its central planning in which 
economic agents were definitely not free to choose their location. This is very much at 
odds with the basic theory; see section 2, which underlies our empirical specification. 
         
To analyze post WWII-city growth, we need cross-section data on the WWII-shock and 
time series data on city population. With respect to the former, Kästner (1949) provides 
West German cross-section data about the loss of housing stock in 1945 relative to the 
housing stock in 1939, and rubble in m
3 per capita in 1945. Data on the number of war 
  14casualties are only available for a sub-set of our cities and are, as opposed to the case of 
Japan, probably not a good indicator of the war-shock to start with.
9 This leaves us with 
two variables that measure the degree of destruction.  
 
Time series data of city population are from the various issues of the Statistical 
Yearbooks, and for 1946 also from the Volks- und Berufszählung vom 29. Oktober 1946 
in den vier Besatzungszonen und Groß-Berlin. As we will run regressions on the relative 
size of cities before and after the WWII (city size relative to the total population), we 
also need statistics on the national population. This is not as easy as it might seem, 
because the German border did change after WW II. There are pre-WW II time series of 
population for the part of Germany that became the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), that is West Germany, in 1949 (Federal Statistical Office). To allow for the 
impact of geography we included the geodesic distance between cities, see below. 
Finally, as an alternative to city population we use data on so called Gewerbesteuer 
(corporate taxes) on the city level to measure city growth. These tax data were taken 
from Statistical Yearbooks and are an indicator of the degree of economic activity.   
 
5.2 The case of a unique equilibrium and the relevance of geography 
As we explained in the previous section, for the case of a unique equilibrium we 
estimate equation (4) where we have to instrument the relative city-growth during 
WWII: si,1939-si,1946.  The city-specific instruments are the destruction of the housing 
stock between 1939-1945, and the rubble per capita per m
3 in 1945. In addition, we 
introduce the role of geography in two ways: 
1.  The relative city growth from 1939-1946 is not only instrumented by its own 
destruction but also by a sum of the distance weighted housing destruction and 
rubble variables of all other cities.  In a very simple way this captures the idea 
that the “geography” of bombing may matter, in the sense that the city growth of 
                                                 
9 For the German case it is in our view not straightforward to include the number of casualties per city as 
a variable measuring the degree of destruction. Systematic data on casualties are lacking and if they were 
available they include prisoners of war (PoWs), foreign workers (Fremdarbeiter), and refugees and are 
therefore not a good indicator of the destruction of a city. For a sub-set of cities, based on Friedrich 
(2002), we have city data on casualties and from these data we know that PoWs, refugees and foreigners 
often contributed more than proportionally to a city’s death toll (they were often denied shelter during 
bombardments). The distribution of these “temporary” inhabitants of a city was often not linked to the 
size of the city. This means that, as opposed to the case of Japan as analyzed by Davis and Weinstein 
(2002, 2004), the number of casualties is probably not a good indicator of city destruction as the change 
in the housing stock.  
 
  15city i during WWII is also determined by the (exogenous) degree of destruction 
of other cities corrected for distance, see also Figure 1. Hence, as opposed to 
Davis and Weinstein (2004), the relative city growth of a city is thereby no 
longer only a function of city-specific variables, that is to say it is no longer 
independent from the fate of other cities.
10 Linking cities in this manner is not a 
problem since the war shock is assumed to be exogenous. We label this 
extension GEO-I 
2.  In equation (4) we add the distance between city i to the one of the three west-
German economic centers (Hamburg, Köln, München) as a control variable, so 
as to capture the idea that for post-war city growth si,1963-si,1946 geography could 
matter as well. In line with for instance a simple market potential function or 
more elaborate new economic geography models, the distance from economic 
centers is thought to be able to  affect a city’s  growth rate. We label this 
extension GEO-II 
 
Without geography, the estimation of (4) using our 2 instruments should yield the 
same results as in Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004) for the case of West-
German cities. This is indeed the case.
11  Table 1 presents the estimation results for 
the model specification with a unique equilibrium. The upper panel gives the 1
st 
stage estimation results and the lower panel the 2
nd stage results. The various 






                                                 
10 Without geography WWII city growth is instrumented in a 1
st stage regression as follows: 
  si,1946-si,1939= μ+  φ1 ln(housing stock)i +  φ2 ln(Rubble)i + ψZi + εi , where Z are the exogenous 
variables, if any, in equation (4) 
With geography we get: 
  si,1946-si,1939= μ+  φ1 ln (∑D
δ
ij  housing stock)i +  φ2 ln(∑D
δ
ij  Rubble)i + ψZi + εi, where Dij is the 
distance between city i and city j, and δ is the distance decay parameter that needs to be estimated.  Davis 
and Weinstein (2004, p. 9) acknowledge that the fact that the relative growth of a city is independent of 
the evolution of other city sizes as a limitation of their approach.    
11 With one caveat: for the actual estimations growth rates are constructed using (xt-xt-i)/xt-i instead of the 
approximation ln(xt)-ln(xt-i) that we, following Davis and Weinstein (2002), used in our previous paper. In 
their discussion of these papers, Head and Mayer (2004) rightly stress that this approximation is only 
valid for small changes and large changes cannot be ruled out.   




Table 1a,  1
st stage regression results            
Δsi,1946-1939 No geography  GEO-I  GEO-II  GEO-I +GEO-II 
Constant  0.203*** 0.210*** 0.138**  0.164** 
Dist. Decay, δ  - -2.215***  -  -1.918*** 
ln(housing)  -0.055** -0.051*  -0.079***  -0.078*** 
ln(rubble/cap.)  -0.096*** -0.104*** -0.086***  -0.098*** 
DummyBerlin - - -0.112  -0.119 
DistanceMünchen - - 0.0003***  0.0003*** 
Adj. R
2 0.629 0.629 0.693  0.699 
Where, “-“ indicates that the variable is not relevant for that model variant, ***=significant 1% level, 
**=significant 5% level, *=significant 10 %Level 
 
Table 1b, 2
nd stage regression results 
Δsi,1963-1946 No Geography  GEO-I  GEO-II  Geo-I +GEO-II 
Constant  0.099*** 0.101*** 0.210***  0.212*** 
si,1946-si,1939  
(α = ρ-1) 
-0.550*** -0.538*** -0.627***  -0.617*** 
DummyBerlin - - -0.393**  -0.392** 
DistanceMünchen - - -0.0003***  -0.0003*** 
SER 0.167  0.167  0.153  0.153 
       See, Table 1a for explanation. 
 
In addition to the variables introduce above, a dummy for Berlin has been added in 
specifications where geography matters. This amounts to excluding Berlin from the data 
set as (the western part of) this city in the period under consideration was isolated from 
the rest of West Germany. München is included as our economic centre. The 
estimations suggest that cities closer to München grow faster.
12 We also looked for a 
                                                 
12 When we took Köln as the economic centre, the resulting coefficient was not significant, and when we 
opted for Hamburg, the distance coefficient became +0.0003
***  which supports the idea that cities in the 
South grew faster.  
  17possible effect of the former FRG-GDR border in the sense that we included the 
distance between a West-German (FRG) city and the border of East Germany (the 
GDR). The results were, however, insignificant once the Berlin dummy was added to 
our set of explanatory variables in equation (4).
13
 
As to the relevance of geography in the 1
st stage regression (the war shock), see Table 
1a, we find that the distance decay parameter is significant and around -2. The latter 
implies that the impact of the war-shock of another city on the city growth of city i 
quickly becomes quite small when the distance between city i and the other city, Dij , 
increases. For city i, it is above all the own destruction that matters and both instruments 
(housing and rubble) are highly significant. All in all the conclusion must be that the 
geography variables are significant but that they do not change the main result as to the 
coefficient for the instrumented wartime city growth si,1946-si,1939 . This coefficient, the 
α-coefficient in equation (4), is our main interest here (see Table 1b). Recall from 
section 4 that α = ρ-1 and we thus find that the estimated coefficient is clearly 
significantly different from -1 which would have been an indication of complete mean 
reversion in 1963. We find mean reversion in the sense that the average West-German 
city recaptured about 50% of the war shock (positive or negative in relative terms) by 
1963. So there is a tendency to return to the pre-war growth path but this tendency, as 
opposed to the findings of Davis and Weinstein for Japan, is far from complete. Adding 
government reconstruction expenses or pre-war city growth as city-specific control 
variables did not change our results.  
 
Table 1b shows that adding geography, and hence allowing for spatial 
interdependencies between cities, does not change the conclusions from Brakman, 
Garretsen, Schramm (2004) despite the fact that the geography variables are significant. 
The question is of course whether this conclusion also holds when we add geography to 
the multiple equilibria framework. Before we address this question, a final remark on 
how our findings in table 1 relate to the corresponding estimation results by Davis and 
Weinstein. They find for Japan when they use city-population as their dependent 
variable that the α-coefficient is not statistically different from –1, which thus means 
                                                 
13 Redding and Sturm (2005) find, however, evidence that supports the relevance of the FRG-GDR split 
for border regions in West Germany (FRG). Their approach differs in a number of important ways from 
our analysis so it is difficult to compare these findings. 
  18that the presence of a unique equilibrium is borne out by the data as valid for the case of 
Japan. It is indeed the case for Japan that the observations in the St, St+1 space of Figure 
2 can be arranged on a line through the origin with slope minus unity. The latter is thus 
not the case for our sample of West German cities. Given this difference one may argue 
that it is more interesting for the German case to start to look for multiple equilibria then 
it is for the case of Japan. Davis and Weinstein (2004, p. 10) note that a finding (like in 
our Table 1) that α is significantly different from –1 is sufficient to establish that there 
somehow must be multiple equilibria.  
 
5.3 Multiple equilibria and the relevance of geography 
In section 4 we arrived at equation (8) as the specification to be used to test for the 
possibility of multiple equilibria. In line with the model underlying Figure 2 we also 
assume that ρ=0 (or in terms of Table 1, α=-1). This assumption follows the theoretical 
set-up in Davis and Weinstein and simply means that the war-shock (the 1
st period, here 
1939-1946) has completely and exactly been reversed in the subsequent period (here, 
1946-1963).  Before we can present our estimation results for the multiple equilibria 
cum geography case, we will first briefly explain the estimation strategy employed by 
Davis and Weinstein to estimate their equivalent of equation (8) for Japan. Using the 
model underlying Figure 2, we can re-write equation (8): 
(9)     ( ) i i i i i i Z b I b I s s μ γ ν δ ν δ δ + + + + = − ) , ( , 1946 , 2 3 3 1946 , 1 1 1 2 1939 , 1963 ,                             
Compared to equation (8) a constant term has been added to allow for a non-zero mean 
error term, Zi stands for control variables like the government reconstruction expenses 
or the pre-war growth rate that one might want to include, δ is to be estimated, and μ is 
the error term. The constant represents the equilibrium in Figure 2 on the line that cuts 
through the origin with slope minus unity. The fact that δ2 (the constant term) represent 
the second equilibrium from the left is nothing but a normalization.  In line with the 
theoretical set-up larger negative (positive) shocks should push a city to smaller (higher) 
equilibria. So when interpreting the estimation results the following restriction on the 
estimated parameters should be kept in mind that is the ordering of the intercepts should 
be (assuming there are most 3 equilibria):
14
 
 δ1+δ2 < δ2 < δ2+δ3  which is identical to δ1 < 0 < δ3. 
                                                 
14 The first equilibrium intercept is: constant+δ1 ; the second equilibrium: constant (=δ2); the third 
equilibrium: δ2+ δ3  etc. 
  19 
A second requirement from the theory as summarized by Figure 2,  is that the thresholds 
b1 and b2  lie between the equilibria. This means that we get the following final intercept 
ordering condition: 
 
(10)   δ1 < b1 < 0 < b2 < δ3
 
Since we do not know the thresholds or the number of equilibria we have to let the data 
pick the corresponding parameter values that maximize the likelihood function using a 
grid-search technique. Using the same strategy as Davis and Weinstein (2004, pp. 25-
26) we estimate these parameters (notably δ1  and δ3) for the three equilibria case as 
follows.
15  First the relative population growth of each city between 1939 and 1946 is 
regressed on our preferred destruction variables (housing stock destruction in 1945, and 
rubble per capita per m
3 in 1945). We then multiplied for each city the housing stock 
destruction and the rubble variable by their respective estimated coefficients so as to 
arrive at city specific measurement of the war shock. Second, we used these shock data 
to group the data as follows (where we take the case of three equilibria as an example): 
the grouping of the war shock data allows us to derive the thresholds b1 and b2. We 
divide the data into 3 groups and we assume initially that the thresholds occur at any 
percentile that is a multiple of 5 (other multiples are also possible, but would suggest a 
level of detail that is not supported by the data). So thresholds occur at (5;10), (5;15),…, 
then (10;15), (10;20)…, etc until all combinations have been tried. For each threshold 
combination we calculate the maximum likelihood parameters and then choose those 
threshold and parameter values that give us the maximum values of the likelihood 
function.
16. Doing this for all possible combinations of 5% quantiles and selecting the 
one that maximizes the likelihood function gives the estimated output as shown in Table 
2.  
 
                                                 
15 We also checked if we could find evidence of more than 3 equilibria but this was never these case so 
we restrict ourselves here to the case of (at most) 3 equilibrium. 
16 For 2 equilibria a similar grid search procedure based on 5
th percentiles on the war shock data was 
followed but with 2 equilibria there is only 1 threshold to take into account. For the case of a unique 
equilibrium one has 2 options. The first one is to go about as we did in Table 1 (were ρ was not 
constrained to be zero), the second option is assume that ρ and thus obtain a likelihood function that can 
be estimated.   
  20In addition, we incorporate the role of geography in a similar vein as for the case of a 
unique equilibrium reported in Table 1. In constructing the war shock data that is the 
basis for the grid search, we ran regressions in which only the own city destruction 
entered (the No Geo columns in Table 2) and regressions in which we took geography 
into account by letting the destruction of other cities (weighted by distance) also be a 
determinant of the war shock data (the Geo columns in Table 2). Finally, given the 
significance of the geography variables in the 2
nd stage regression as shown in Table 1b 
we included the Berlin dummy and the distance to München in our set of control 
variables when estimating equation (9). 
 
Table 2. Estimation results for multiple equilibria and the role of geography   
Δsi,1963-1939  No Geo, 2 
equil. 
No Geo, 3 
equil. 
Geo, 2 equil.  Geo, 3 equil. 
Constant (=δ2) 0.219***  -0.055  0.284***  0.458*** 
DummyBerlin -0.389*** -0.419*** -0.419*** -0.413*** 
DistanceMünchen -0.0003*** -0.0002**  -0.0002**  -0.0003*** 





b1 threshold -0.191  -0.234  -0.004  -0.004 




  - -0.191  - 0.017 
LogLik. 38.389 41.074 38.766 41.710 
AIC, Akaike  -0.893  -0.937  -0.903  -0.954 




δ1 < b1 <0 
3 equilibria:  
δ1 < b1 <0<b2<δ3




*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
LR-stat (# equilibria)  No Geo  Geo  
1 vs 2  15.144  15.898 
2 vs 3        5.370**        5.888** 
Test statistic is distributed as χ(1). And
** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
  21The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test rejects 1 equilibrium against 2 equilibria for all specifications. When 2 
equilibria are tested against 3 equilibria, this is accepted at the 5% level.
17 
 
     
Table 2 does not show the results for the case of 1 equilibrium since we already know 
from Table 1 what the conclusions are. 
18 For the case of 2 equilibria (1
st and 3
rd 
column) we find that δ1 < 0 which is what theory tells us to expect. Larger negative 
shocks push cities to smaller equilibria. But the ordering criterion, which also takes the 
threshold restrictions into account (δ1 < b1 < 0, see last row of the Table), is only met 
when we allow geography to play a role. So there is evidence in favour of 2 equilibria. 
Furthermore the LR-test, see bottom of Table 2, indicates that the null hypothesis of a 
unique equilibrium versus the alternative of 2 equilibria is always rejected (p-value: 
0.00). Given the fact that the estimations in Table 2 are based on the assumption of ρ=0 
(α=-1) evidence in favour of multiple equilibria is less of a surprise if one takes into 
account that we found α to be around -0.6 in Table 1b for the case of a unique 
equilibrium. This also helps to explain why Davis and Weinstein find no evidence in 
favour of multiple equilibria (given that they already established that α is (almost) -1 in 
their equivalent of estimating equation (4) for city population in Japan).  
 
When one allows for 3 equilibria it is true both in the geography and the non-geography 
case (4
th and 2
nd column respectively) that the δ-coefficients are significant but that the 
restriction,  δ1 < 0 < δ3, only holds for the non-geography case. For this case the 
threshold criterion is not met (last row of Table 2). In addition, the LR-test indicates that 
we cannot reject the null of 2 equilibria versus the alternative of 3 equilibria at the 1% 
level (p-value:0.02).
19 So there is no firm evidence to support the model with 3 
equilibria. 
 
                                                 
17 A different approach to the same problem (testing for a threshold) can be found in Hansen (1996. 
2000). Using Hansen (1996) we can test for the presence of 1 threshold in the war shock data for our 
sample of West German cities. This requires that all parameters are allowed to be different for the two 
subgroups, this is only possible for our specification when we do not include the Berlin-dummy or the 
distance to Munich variable. We then find evidence in favour 2 equilibria (instead of 1 equilibrium).       
18 When we did estimate equation (9) for the case of 1 equilibrium we found, not very surprisingly, that 
coefficients for the 3 variables (constant, Berlin-dummy, distance to München) are somewhat different to 
those reported in Table 1, the reason being that we now impose that ρ=0 (α =-1) and the estimation results 
shown in Table 1 indicate that ρ is not zero (α=-0.6) for Germany. When we estimated equation without 
the Berlin dummy and the distance to München, the evidence in favour of the “geo-2 equilibrium” model 
is less clear-cut.   
19 Results for more than 3 equilibria did not improve matters and never met the ordering criteria.  
  22Our overall conclusions are twofold. First, there is evidence in favour of multiple 
equilibria for the case of German city growth and the WWII shock. If we take the 
ordering restrictions that follow from Figure 2 into consideration, we conclude that the 
German case is best described by 2 equilibria and also that this 2 equilibria specification 
is to be preferred to the case of a unique equilibrium.
20 This is in contrast with the case 
of Japan as analysed by Davis and Weinstein. Second, the preference for the 2 equilibria 
specification crucially depends on the inclusion of geography in the construction of the 
city-specific war shock variable. Without geography, the evidence for multiple 
equilibria is much weaker because the ordering criteria are not met. So, geography 
really matters. This shows that it can make a difference whether or not spatial 
interdependencies between cities are allowed to play a role. Our operationalisation of 
geography is very simple, and can no doubt be improved upon, but our results suggest 
that its incorporation may make a crucial difference. A more elaborate analysis of 
geography into the multiple equilibrium framework of this paper would be an 
interesting topic for further research.  
 
5.4 Further discussion 
Finally, a few remarks as to the underlying model and the potential for further research. 
First, from section 2 we know that the new economic geography model by Krugman 
(1991) is the benchmark for the estimations. The ordering criteria that follow from this 
model are clearly very important for our conclusions with respect to the relevance of 
multiple equilibria (and this also holds for the conclusions in Davis and Weinstein 
(2004) about Japan).
21 Without these criteria, conclusions as to the preferred model are 
different (see Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (SBC) information criteria in Table 2). 
Further research should tell us whether and how restrictions like those given by 
equation (10) are consistent with other NEG models. To illustrate this, consider the 
following example. Puga (1999) develops a model in which the graph of long run 
equilibria with a region’s share of the footloose production as a function of 
transportation costs, takes the form of a bell-shaped curve. This implies that different 
                                                 
20 The maximum likelihood for the 2 equilibrium case with geography was achieved for an 85-15% split 
of the war shock data. This means, with a threshold of b1=-0.004 (see Table 2), that the following 12 
relatively less “war struck” cities remained in the initial equilibrium Ω of Figure 2: Flensburg, 
Neumünster, Lübeck, Herne, Recklinghausen, Leverkusen, B-Gladbach, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Erlangen, 
Regensburg, and Ingolstadt.        
21 See for instance Davis and Weinstein (2004, p. 33) where without the ordering criteria one would pick 
the model with 2 equilibria as the preferred model.   
  23long run equilibria may be characterized by the same relative city-size (but for different 
values of the transportation costs).  So the question becomes how to construct ordering 
criteria when a particular Si can be associated with multiple equilibria.  
 
Second, as we discussed in section 4, the constraint that ρ=0 is imposed by Davis and 
Weinstein (2004) for econometrical reasons too (besides the justification for this 
assumption provided by Figure 2). We also estimated equation (9) when ρ is not 
constrained to any specific value, and where we instrumented the war shock in a similar 
way as in Table 1. Here too, we found that the inclusion of geography makes a real 
difference. The reason to stick to the ρ=0 assumption in Table 2 is that this assumption 
is in line with the theoretical model on which Figure 2 is based (any other slope than 
minus unity in Figure 2 is difficult to rationalize in our view to start with).
22   
 
Third, one of the innovations of Davis and Weinstein (2004) is that they not only test 
their equivalent of equations (4) and (9) with city-population as the city-growth variable 
but they are (quite uniquely) able to do similar estimations with total manufacturing 
activity and even sector data on manufacturing activity as indicators of city growth. This 
is interesting because the location behaviour of citizens and firms following a shock like 
the WWII destruction might be quite different. For these alternative city growth 
measures Davis and Weinstein do, however, also not find evidence of multiple 
equilibria. Unfortunately, city specific data on economic activity for the period under 
consideration are not available for German cities. The best we could come up with 
based on our main data source, the Statistical Yearbook, was the use of city data on 
Gewerbesteuer (corporate taxes). Correcting for differences in tax rates between cities 
and over time, we took changes in a city’s corporate tax income (relative to the 
corresponding corporate tax income for West Germany as a whole), as an indicator of 
the relative change of the degree of economic activity for each city in our sample. Using 
the relative change of cities’ corporate tax receipts, we estimated the same 
specifications as to those underlying Tables 1 and 2 for relative population growth. The 
                                                 
22 When we estimate equation (9) for the “unconstrained” ρ, the wartime city growth enters equation (9) 
(compare equations (8) and (9)). We then first regress wartime growth on the housing stock and rubble 
variable and next proceed in a similar fashion as with the estimations for Table 2: we use the fitted values 
of this regression to construct the war shock variable for each city and based on the data for this variable 
we perform our grid search as outlined in the main text. When we allow cities to have different intercepts 
(but the same rate of mean reversion, so the war shock coefficient is the same for all cities), we again find 
that the results vary whether or not we do geography into account. The war shock coefficient is about -0.5 
(in line with Table 1).  
  24results are in line with those reported in Tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix). When we 
excluded the outlier Hamburg from our sample, the estimation of equation (4) yields an 
α-coefficient of -0.552 in the GEOI+II case (with rubble per capita but not the housing 
stock being significant in the 1
st stage). Estimating equation (9) with the relative change 
in cities’ Gewerbesteuer as the dependent variable, also shows that the model with 
multiple equilibria is to be preferred to the model with an unique equilibrium: we now 
even find evidence for the case of 3 equilibria especially when geography is added (the 
ordering criteria are met too in this case as the Appendix illustrates). These results 
suggest that it may be worthwhile to look in more detail at other (and preferred) 
indicators of economic activity on the city level.
23       
 
Fourth, and finally, for Germany the 20
th century provides potentially interesting other 
shocks to assess the impact of large, temporary shock on city-growth. Apart from 
WWII, the split of Germany in the FRG and the GDR after WWI and the subsequent re-
unification of Germany in 1989 come to mind as well as the impact of WWI and the 
turmoil between 1918 and 1939.  In order to analyse these shocks too, the present 
framework will, however, not do because of the fact that these shocks are not city-
specific (like the FRG GDR split in 1949). Different techniques like (panel) unit root 
tests are called for analyse the multitude of shocks that hit German cities in the past 
century. This is the topic we hope to take up next.                        
              
6. Conclusions 
Many modern trade and growth models are characterized by multiple equilibria, but it is 
difficult to test for the presence of multiple equilibria. Davis and Weinstein (2002) and 
Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004) study the effects of a large exogenous shock 
(WWII) on city growth for the case of Japan and Germany respectively. They both find 
evidence that the WWII shock tended to undo itself over time, although only partially 
for the case of Germany. This would suggest that city growth is not characterized by 
multiple equilibria. Based on the methodology developed by Davis and Weinstein 
(2004) for the case of Japanese cities and WWII, we test explicitly for multiple 
equilibria for West German cities in the present paper. In doing so, and in addition to 
the Davis and Weinstein framework, we look at the spatial interdependencies between 
                                                 
23 One way to go about (see Redding and Sturm, 2005) might be to try to make use of Census-data that 
provide city-specific information on the production structure and employment.  
  25cities. The main findings are twofold. First, multiple equilibria seem to be present in the 
evolution of German city size distribution. We find evidence of a model with 2 stable 
equilibria. Second, the explicit inclusion of geography matters. Evidence for multiple 
equilibria is weaker when spatial interdependencies are not taken into account.          
Appendix: Estimations results with Corporate Tax Income (Gewerbesteuer), Δti,t 
 
I) Testing for a unique equilibrium (estimation of equation (4)) 
 
Table A1,  1
st stage regression results            
Δti,1946-1939 No geography  GEO-I  GEO-II  GEO-I  +GEO-
II 
Constant  0.427*** 0.432*** 0.281**  0.324* 
Dist. Decay, δ  - -2.993  - -1.908** 
ln(rubble/cap.)  -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.186*** -0.204*** 
DummyBerlin - - -0.858**
  -0.869**
 
DistanceMünchen - - 0.0004  0.0004 
Adj. R
2 0.229 0.219 0.276 0.268 
Where, “-“ indicates that the variable is not relevant for that model variant, ***=significant 1% level, 




nd stage regression results 
Δti,1963-1946 No Geography  GEO-I  GEO-II  Geo-I +GEO-II 
Constant  -0.060 -0.056  0.150 0.0.143 
ti,1946-ti,1939  
(α = ρ-1) 
-0.360* -0.427  -0.383* -0.522** 
DummyBerlin - -  0.099  -0.034 
DistanceMünchen - -  -0.0005*  -0.0005* 










II) Testing for multiple equilibria (estimation of equation (9)) 
Table A3 Estimation results for multiple equilibria with corporate tax income  
Δti,1963-1939  No Geo, 2 
equil. 
No Geo, 3 
equil. 
Geo, 2 equil.  Geo, 3 equil. 
Constant (=δ2) 0.323**  0.128  0.322**  0.154 
DummyBerlin -0.403 0.136  -0.400 -0.154 
DistanceMünchen -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0006* 










  - -0.139  - 0.183 
LogLik. -38.233 -36.514 -37.593 -35.899 




δ1 < b1 <0 
3 equilibria:  
δ1 < b1 <0<b2<δ3




*** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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